|
MORE FREE TERM PAPERS
SOCIOLOGY:
|
|
|
SINGAPORE AND THE CULTURAL CRITIQUE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSITIONS
The centrality of the Human Rights discourse in contemporary international
relations is undeniable. After being in the shadows of the great ideological
debate of the Cold War for almost fifty years, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, drafted in 1948, has again come into the fore. Despite
the universal underpinnings expressed throughout the Declaration - and
later conventions and covenants - worldwide support remains divided. In
fact, two opposing theoretical camps have been formed in the international
community, one representing universalism and the other, cultural relativism.
Although universalists applaud the indiscriminate applicability of Human
Rights on a global scale, relativists argue that these rights represent
only one of many possible socio-cultural normative doctrines and, as a
result, can only be legitimately applied to the particular cultural context
in which they were formulated.
There is a number of nations worldwide that not only refuse to adhere
to the declaration, but also stand in direct opposition to its fundamental
tenets - their reason: universality. How can this be? Are human rights
not by and for all human beings? The answer is a resounding "NO!"
from those who argue that Human Rights have been singularly crafted by
the West, represent uniquely Western values, and thus, cannot apply to
any other culture other than that of the West. One of the most vocal proponents
of this line of thinking is Singapore. This former British colony, despite
its miniscule territory and short history as an independent state, has
taken a leadership role in speaking out against Human Rights propagation
and its presumed universal political and ethical legitimacy in international
affairs.
The central purpose of this paper is to examine the Singaporean cultural
relativist critique of Human Rights. Singapore will be the primary focus
of analysis due to the fact that it unequivocally espouses the relativist
doctrine, is a leader of worldwide opposition to the Human Rights movement,
and is unique in that it is one of the few industrialized countriesi actively
endorsing the pursuit of and essentially non-Western model of socio-political
organization and development. I will begin by defining the pertinent terms
of this paper and continue by briefly describing the central tenets of
the relativist critique of Human Rights. I will then move into a detailed
examination of some of the fundamental flaws associated with cultural
relativism and will show how, as a result, relativism may not be the best
argument for Singapore to use in order to continue and maintain its non-
Western ideological path. I will contend, however, that despite these
problems, the substance of the relativist position cannot and should not
be ignored and, consequently, will assess the feasibility for the Human
Rights discourse to address cultural and collectivist considerations.
To conclude, I will offer some final thoughts about the universal/relative
debate and make some suggestions as to Singapore's future role as the
voice of dissent in a world still dominated by Western rhetoric.
Abbreviations and Important Terms:
HR - Human Rights CR - Cultural Relativism UN - United Nations
UDHR - Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Vienna+5 - World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993
PAP - People's Action Party in Singapore
The theoretical and contentious nature of this subject force me to engage
in a lengthy discussion of terms and definitions in order to attempt to
avoid as much confusion as possible, and preclude semantic debate in favour
of the discussion of more substantive issues. I am by no means stating
that the definitions used in this paper will not be provocative - quite
the contrary - however, in order to make any sort of logical argument,
I hope that this section will form the lexical basis required to allow
for the achievement of some semblance of a common understanding.
First and foremost, the Human Rights (HR) movement posits that, "all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.""
Because each "human being is sacred, certain things ought to be done
for every human being,"iii and thus, they are, by extension, universally
and equally applicable to all. "These are moral claims which are
inalienable and inherent in all human individuals by virtue of their humanity
alone,"iv The obvious implication is that the HR doctrine transcends
regional, cultural and state boundaries and unifies humanity by way of
these shared values. The HR label will be used to refer to the general
principles and protocols expressed in all conventions and covenants pertaining
to this area of international agreement, however, the UDHR will be the
central document of focus throughout this paper.
Cultural Relativism (CR) will be used to refer to the school of thought
which claims that, "there can be no essential characteristics of
human nature or human rights which exist outside of discourse, history,
context.. .agency [or culture]"v As a result, there are no universal
principles that can be applied to all human beings and morality is ultimately
derived from a specific culture alone. In very broad terms, CR thought
holds that, "one should try to evaluate and understand another culture
[or] society on its own terms and relative to its own values and beliefs.'™
On a related note, Singapore often defends their ethical and social positions
in terms of Asian Values. Dr. Chan Heng Chee, the former Singaporean representative
to the UN, at the Asia 2000 Foundation elaborated stating that Asian Values
in Singapore emphasize, "the importance of the family, respect for
authority, avoidance of conflict, law and order, education, the individual
acting in harmony with the group, [and finally] the value of the greater
good over the individual."™ Although some of these values will be
examined and evaluated on an individual basis, they will, for the most
part, be treated as a unitary ethical doctrine.
Legitimacy is one of the most difficult terms to define so a rather broad
understanding will be employed. Legitimacy will be assessed on the basis
of the extent to which the institution or system both embodies the principles
and desires of its constituents and acts in accordance with these principles.
In other words it can be indirectly measured by the degree of constituent
support for the institution or system. As a corollary, authority will
be assessed in direct relation to the level of legitimacy of a particular
institution or system. I do realize that these definitions are highly
controversial and, in their present form, represent a systematic Western-democratic
bias. For the sake of clarity their inherent ambiguity required a resolution,
however imperfect the one chosen may prove to be.
Singapore's CR Critique of HR:
Singapore's critique of Human Rights applies to almost every article
in the original UDHR. Although it is possible to go through the document
article-by-article, such an analysis would be both time-consuming and
redundant. As a result, three overarching principles will be extracted
and examined in that they adequately represent the fundamental arguments
Singapore has raised against the universal applicability of HR: universalism,
Western bias, and violation of state sovereignty.
A: Universalism:
According to Singapore and other countries adhering to CR, universalism
is the most contentious of HR assumptions. In fact, the fundamental principle
of the UDHR is, "the recognition of the inherent dignity and.the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [which
serves as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world"viii
This stance was unequivocally reinforced at the World Conference of Human
Rights in Vienna in 1993 that reaffirmed that, "all human rights
are universal, indivisible...interdependent and interrelated."™ Clearly,
the HR movement purports to not only define and categorize human beings,
but also places one universal norm above all others, establishing an international
ethical hierarchy. For CR, this is both unacceptable and undesirable.
Despite a high degree international support expressed at Vienna,x Singapore
and other nations still raised the cultural card in opposition to the
spirit and principles of the conference. First and foremost, the UDHR
was drafted, "at a time when most Third World countries were still
under colonial domination. [Those] that later incorporated. the Declaration.did
so under western pressure."xi Not only does this indicate that there
was a strong and justifiable sense of exclusion from the formulation and
development of HR, but also, that it was being forced upon the new nations
shortly following decolonisation when they lacked both the strength and
experience to resist western political pressure. The absence of most nations
from the development of HR as well as the fact that many adopted the principles
under duress both preclude the consolidation of a true feeling of universality.
In addition, CR points to the extreme ethical and moral diversity in
both theory and practice throughout the world. Although this relies on
a relatively weak argumentative logic, it does point to the fact that
there is a general lack of global consensus, both between individuals
and states, when it comes to the moral foundations of HR. In fact, some
would go as far as to argue that in order to determine the universality
of HR, "all human beings all over the world should agree about the
meaning of human rights."™ Whether one adopts this criterion or restricts
it to the agreement of state governments representing their people, universalism
would be difficult to secure. MacDonald points out that, "cultures
vary a great deal in both their values and their modes of life and [thus]
there is no limit we can impose, from a theoretical point of view, on
the range of such cultural variability."xiii Because uniformity is
a consequence of the adoption of HR, it becomes most problematic to those
cultures that currently deviate most from what has been established as
a universally desirable code of conduct. As a result, the effects of such
a dramatic shift in socio-cultural values would be most pronounced in
non-Western societies.
B: 'Westernism':
Singapore has vehemently expressed on several occasions the inherent
Western bias in all HR agreements, and, in fact, in the principles themselves.
HR, in the cosmopolitan tradition, are agent-centred and are, "asserted
as claims by individuals and against the power of the state."xiV
This focus on the individual as the fundamental basis of society is a
western construction and stands in direct opposition to the Asian Values
that favour social harmony and value the whole above the individual. As
a result, the very foundation of Asian society - and most non-western
collectivist societies for that matter -would have to be fundamentally
altered in favour of the western model if HR were to be adopted in their
entirety. Jack Donnely points out that, "the protection of individual
rights against the demands of society was.not part of traditional non-western
thinking."xv Divergent conceptions of central tenets are endemic
in this debate and underscore the lack of consensus for the universality
of HR.
Relativists have also, "charge[d] universalists with cultural imperialism.[and]
arrogan[ce] in their belief that their own conception of rights must apply
to everyone."™ The attempt to elevate western ideals to the status
of universal ideals is a pretension that has several consequences. It
mistakenly conflates the subjective western vision of what is good, with
objective and universal truth. Not only is this an erroneous conclusion,
but also one that is highly derogatory. It serves no purpose other than
the marginalization and denigration of all non-western values, and ironically
stands in direct opposition to tolerance, a supposed virtue central in
all modern western liberal democracies. By not tolerating the beliefs
and values of other peoples, western nations run the risk of not only
alienating those societies, but also betraying the very basis upon which
HR and liberal rights were established.
The next point of contention raised by Singapore and the CR is that nations
of the West have achieved a higher level of development. As a result,
the same ethics, political systems and importance of rights cannot apply
to countries not subject to the same set of circumstances. In fact, the
ambassador of Singapore spoke out at Vienna+5 stating that, "only
those who have forgotten the pangs of hunger will think of consoling the
hungry by telling them that they should be free before they eat."xvii
Although the 'food before freedom' argument tends to be put forward by
the most repressive regimes to justify their continued authority,xviii
the vast developmental disparities between the industrialized world and
less-developed countries must be considered when evaluating cross-cultural
considerations. In fact it is argued that, "the circumstances vary
widely enough among individual societies to require differing conceptions
of human rights."xix
CR responds to the universalist challenge by arguing that, "all
cultures are equal in status.no particular cultural form.can legitimately
be regarded as superior to or more favoured than any other."xx The
dichotomy between relativism and universalism in this sense is striking,
in that the former is now relying upon fundamental equalities for its
defence rather than the latter. This can be attributed, once again, to
the differential value placed upon the society or culture in question
rather than the individuals of which it is composed.
C: Violations of State Sovereignty and the Value of Society:
The real question that arises in the debate between HR and CR is whether
individuals form societies or whether societies form individuals. HR presupposes
an invariable human nature whose essence can be determined through reason
alone. Wilson points out that, "having established the nature of
a human ontology, objectivity can be claimed for value judgements [of
any kind]."xxi Unfortunately, there is no proof that can be used
to substantiate either this theoretical conception, or the existence of
an innate human nature at all. In fact, CR contends that, "existence
must precede essence,"xxii and that existence is defined and determined
solely by one's culture. Not only does this formulation give extreme moral
importance to society in developmental terms, but also directly contradicts
the essentialist construction of human nature required for the universality
of HR to be a logical possibility.
The central feature of the CR doctrine is that it ascribes fundamental
moral value to culture. "Because individuals are constituted by the
community, the demands of social ethics override - or should override
- the imperatives of conscience."™ Consequently, the individual and
his or her ethical values are a product of, and thus cannot exist prior
to, their society. Although there has been a move toward increased global
interaction, the lack of a single civil society and common ethical values
precludes the establishment of a universal rights regime. As a result,
"the specific application of policy is therefore best left to each
community to decide for itself."xxiv
Despite the fact that a given country may have several cultures within
its borders, the CR critique ascribes primary cultural importance to the
state and thus relies on the primacy of the principle of state sovereignty
in order to thwart foreign cultural imperialism. State supremacy allows
for the government to direct the cultures within its territories, but
also has a (hopefully) legitimate right to do so based upon the consent
of the people residing therein. As Rosas argues, "if nations are
both sovereign and equal, it is difficult to see how human beings could
be equal, except within each nation-state."™ Further, it is for this
reason that Singapore and other countries argue that HR are an attempt
by the West to violate their sovereignty and that allowing the individual
to encroach upon the state would preclude rapid development and social
progress. Therefore, "the outside world should respect the choices
made by individual nation-
states."xxvi
Cultural Relativism: Too Relative for Its Own Good?
Although the CR critique of HR points to many of the problems inherent
to purporting universal truth, it too suffers from several fundamental
flaws that render its ability to act as an independent and coherent theoretical
doctrine at best precarious. These flaws inevitably diminish the strength
of Singapore's position on the matter. In addition, there are some characteristics
particular to the Singaporean case which further limit the extent to which
cultural relativism provides an adequate justification for their blatant
opposition to human rights. Although each argument is based upon a set
of assumptions concerning the nature of man, I have decided, considering
the goal and length of my analysis, to omit their inclusion in this discussion.3™
A: Fundamental Flaws of CR:
The most pressing problem of the CR argument is that it undermines it
own truth through contradictory propositions and ultimately, implies ethical
nihilism.xxviii To elaborate, because CR postulates that both culture
is the ultimate source of ethical truth for its constituents, and that
this holds true across all cultures, it is, essentially, proposing a new
set of universal standards through which to understand and conceptualize
culture, ethics, and politics. Ironically, however, it uses these standards
to argue that universal ethical standards cannot and do not exist. As
a result the argument is contradictory and hence, self-nullifying. As
Wilson explains, "it generates a meta-narrative with totalising claims
at the same time as generating a self-undermining critique of the very
possibility of meta-narratives and totalising claims."xxix In short,
CR uses the very same methodological and argumentative techniques that
it criticizes in the HR doctrine. As a result, its independent theoretical
worth and logical credibility are lost.
The second major flaw of CR centres around the fundamental assumptions
used to characterize cultures themselves. Not only are cultures assumed
to be homogeneous and unitary, but also they are constructed in such a
way that they are singular source of ethical truth for their constituent
members. In fact, "for their doctrine to be coherent.relativists
seem to hold a nineteenth-century notion of culture as the basis for all
difference and similarity between human beings."xxx (italics mine)
This blatantly ignores the internal divisions and distinctions within
cultures themselves - such as age, social class, gender -that can have
profound effects upon the identity, actions and values of the individuals
concerned. The proverbial 'generation gap' speaks volumes as to the differential
effects of other contributing factors. In addition, the multiple levels
of association characteristic of most modern citizens - e.g. family, community,
state, religious affiliation, etc. - are entirely ignored and, as a result,
are ascribed no moral worth whatsoever despite the primary ethical importance
such organizations may play in one's individual life. Finally, the undeniable
influence of one's political and economic system on individual life, values
and social organization is entirely disregarded. Ironically, the CR school
of thought glosses over the differences within cultures in exactly the
same manner HR proponents neglected cultural variability.
CR suffers from another contradiction, this time not in theory, but in
practice. There is often the mistake made of conflating the concept of
culture with that of the nation-state in the case of specific state governments.
In fact, they are often treated as one and the same. Although communitarian
thinkers would agree, arguing that, "shared values exist within cultures,
which are roughly coterminous with nation-states",xxxi it seems problematic
when one considers both multinational and multicultural states as well
as the important influence of sub-national and trans-national affiliations.
In addition, this allows for the possibility that the state be solely
responsible for the direction of ethical value in the particular society.
Although this seems logical when one considers the state as the expression
of the free will of the people, logic is at best questionable when one
considers repressive and inegalitarian regimes. In fact, "an undeniable
truth is that many governments around the world continue to carry out
abominable acts against 'their' populations, and relativism is the most
useful available ideology which facilitates international acquiescence
in state repression."'™ As a result, the CR model relies on an overly
simplified conception of culture and modern society and can result in
the conservation of repressive political regimes.
Finally, CR has systematically neglected the empirical evidence that
indicates that universal HR have become increasingly valued by most non-western
societies. Not only did 171 of the 192 countries in the world participate
in the World Conference in Vienna in 1993, but also the grand majority,
accepted the major provisions of the agreement and agreed to work to reinforce
the HR regime.xxxiii In addition, there have been many sub-national groups,
especially indigenous people, which have also used the universal provisions
- which are, culturally speaking, 'foreign' to them - to "engage
in... negotiations with their governments over their constitutional claims
for linguistic and territorial rights and political sovereignty."xxxiv
This is especially important when one considers the manner in which the
majority of these peoples were politically, economically, and socially
marginalized by the colonial administrations for centuries. These factual
anecdotes not only indicate the possibility to use HR to retain and develop
one's culture, but also that HR and culture are by no means, necessarily
antagonistic.
B: Singapore's Particularity:
NB - This section marks where I completely changed my thesis and focus
the other day, so I apologize if the writing style is the best, I haven't
had too much of a chance to refine it yet. The following sections are
also lacking their endnote marks, again, because I haven't had a chance
to insert them, but they are here on my desk on paper and will be added
soon. I do hope that you get the general idea of what I'm trying to get
across despite this
Although CR has several fundamental flaws and oversights when it comes
to its argumentative strength, when applied to Singapore's situation,
its validity all but disintegrates. The first and most pressing problem
is the issue of development. Singapore ranks 24th in the world in the
UN's Human development Report 2000xxxv, yet it still argues that its people
need food before rights. One of the most economically and socially prosperous
countries in the world using the same argument as the poorest of nations
- in which literally thousands of people starve to death on a yearly basis
- is both illogical and disconcerting. In fact, it does nothing more than
belittle the plight of poverty. Although it has been argued that Singapore
can serve as an example of the potential economic success of such a stance,
there has been no evidence gathered to substantiate any relationship between
political repression and economic development, let alone proof of a causal
link.
On the surface, it may seem as though, as the government would suggest,
that Singapore is a country that represents a single cultural unit. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Aside from the diverse ethic make-up
of the country - composed of people of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and European
descent"™ - Singapore is both linguistically and religiously diverse.
Clearly, there is no real evidence that supports the contention that the
state is coterminous with a single or dominant culture. Interestingly,
however, the PAP dominated government, which has been in power since 1959,
has attempted to create a uniform and homogeneous culture from the top-down
by launching a series of cultural campaigns geared to assimilate the people
of Singapore into a uniform, government-sanctioned model. Although most
states do tend to support the creation of a national identity in the civic
sense, the PAP government has attempted, on several occasions to go beyond
the political in an attempt to institute a new socio-political culture
through government mandate. The two central initiatives were the "Speak
Mandarin Campaign" and the establishment of the Institute of East
Asian Philosophies, both of which attempted to instil Confucian values
imported from the North into an ethnically diverse cosmopolis. Ironically,
the government's desired national identity was far from representative
of any of the major cultural groups historically linked to the area (only
1% spoke Mandarin at home and less were religiously adherents of Confucianism)
Although both initiatives ended in failure, the flagrant attempts of
the government to both dictate and define culture through a systematic
program of assimilation is astounding. This policy stance not only raises
questions as to the extent to which the government of Singapore actually
represents the values of the state's constituent cultures, but also, the
very legitimacy of the government's authority. Obviously, the Singaporean
administration is engaging in a subversive, yet highly systematic attempt
at cultural discrimination within its own borders. This is in complete
violation of any of the caveats proclaimed in public that call for intercultural
respect from the nations of the west. As a result, the moral and practical
force of the CR critique is entirely lost. The distinction drawn by the
actions of the Singaporean government between cultures that can be defended
using the relativist argument and those that cannot is arbitrary and unjustifiable,
both from a CR and HR point of view.
In order to assess the potential reasons behind such blatant inconsistencies,
one must examine the nature of Singapore's political system. Although,
constitutionally speaking, Singapore is a democratic country there are
several constraints on the traditional mechanisms of the democratic model
that decisively act in favour of the government's maintenance of the status
quo. First, despite the use of regular elections and the legal permissibility
of opposing political parties, as Lawson points out, these alternative
parties are systematically excluded and marginalized by way of several
government measures, including a lack of government funding, only 9 days
to prepare for an election, the imprisonment of potential political 'dissidents'
without a trial, and several government sponsored 'defamation of character
civil suits' geared toward depleting the financial resources of potential
political adversaries. Although it would invalidate the constitution and
discredit the government's authority if it were to make political opposition
illegal, through the abovementioned measures, the government has weakened
political opposition to the point of being virtually entirely ineffective.
Although this argument does use very western notions of legitimacy and
democracy, if the Singaporean government maintains that it legitimately
represents the free will of its people in both principle and spirit, it
must subscribe fully to the democratic institutions that can adequately
substantiate such a claim. This is not to say that the citizens of Singapore
do not have the democratic right to elect PAP, nor that they cannot allow
for an authoritarian government to rule, quite to the contrary, however,
they should be free to decide both the type of political system used in
their country as well as the policies and mandates it is to enact.
The purpose of this section is by no means to argue for or against the
relative strengths of democracy in Singapore, but rather to underscore
and illustrate the effects the socio-political system have on policy.
To elaborate, I hope to have pointed out that Singapore's political system,
despite its democratic label, discriminates both against the cultures
as well as potential political opposition within its borders. Consequently,
it may be possible that the government lacks the legitimacy necessary
to speak for the people of Singapore in terms of cultural and ethical
objectivity. Therefore, it may be that the true principles of the people
of Singapore are divergent from those expressed and enacted by the PAP
government. If this is the case, then the true reason for the use of CR
in Singapore is not for the protection of the Asian cultural heritage
or its correlate values, but more so represents a pragmatic political
move on the part of the PAP - a measure to maintain and enhance their
own power rather than that of their people.
Where do We Go From Here?
As I have illustrated, the CR critique successfully points to several
of the limitations and oversights of the current HR regime, most notably,
its fundamental western socio-cultural bias. However, despite the importance
of these substantive issues, the argument itself is also subject to some
of the same major flaws revealed in the universalist paradigm. Especially
when one applies the CR logic to Singaporean circumstances, the argument
becomes less and less convincing, eventually leading to the question of
whether culture plays as important role as the PAP government would have
you believe. Despite the theoretical shortcomings of both approaches,
I think it would be both counter-productive and undesirable to simply
disregard the potential benefit of each.
However, the central problem of this entire debate remains: Which one
is right? It is not my goal nor, in my opinion, within my capacity to
argue categorically one way or another. In fact, I would go so far as
to argue that neither one can or will ever be proven beyond a shadow of
a doubt. Therefore I propose the continuation of the discourse between
the two schools in order to come closer to common conception of rights,
one based upon consent and shared, or at least mutually respected, values.
A: Third Generation Human Rights:
This challenge to both the relativist and universalist school is formidable,
and has been in the works essentially since 1978, when so-called third
generation human rights were first defined by Dr Vasak at the International
Human Rights Institute in Strasbourg as, "those born of the obvious
brotherhood of men and of their indispensable solidarity; rights which
would unite men in a finite world."xxxvii Third generation HR, most
ardently advocated by the governments and peoples of the non-western world,
encompassed collective rights to development, to peace, to communication,
to difference, to national self-determination, and to a clean environment.
What differentiates this new class of rights most from both first and
second generation HR is that, "they can only be realized through
the concerted effort of all the actors on the social scene"xxxviii
Thus, it no longer is simply a strategic interplay between the state and
the individual, but rather a multilevel game of overlapping associations
that operate in harmony to achieve a higher and common purpose.
Although one could argue that respect for aggregate individual rights
could equally ensure adherence to the proposed third generation collective
rights proposals, VanderWal points out that the rights must be understood
as being, "of a non-reducible collective nature...that is, they cannot
be analyzed adequately and without loss of meaning in terms of individual
rights"xxxix Because, as Singapore and other non-western states have
argued, individuals cannot be fully understood in the absence of their
social context, individual rights, without any reference to the correlate
social group within which all individuals operate would be both futile
and ineffective. Consequently, codification of these rights would require
the extension of a separate branch of the HR doctrine, on equal level
with the political and social values currently enshrined in the UDHR.
Evidently, third generation human rights speak to many of the holes left
in the original human rights regime that I identified in section II of
this paper. First, it would serve to underscore and potentially reify
the notion of culture in international law and, as a result, include the
basic social values characteristic of most non-western cultures in an
area from which they have historically been excluded. Although some collective
rights are currently recognized in international law - most notably state
sovereignty - reference to sub-national, national, and super-national
groups would underscore their importance and influence in both western
and non-western cultures and further, subject them to the same duties
required of states in relations to individuals. This last effect, although
not often associated to third generation human rights, would, for the
most part, preclude many of the 'cultural tyranny' scenarios raised by
opponents of such an extension of the human rights literature. There would,
consequently, be less of a western bias in the human rights regime, and
thus, would afford HR a more legitimate basis upon which the general HR
mandate could both be developed and expanded. As a result, further protection
could ensue for nations and minorities, historically subject to the many
forms of cultural imperialism and discrimination. Although third generation
human rights may not offer a resolution per se to the antagonism between
universalists and relativists, the successful incorporation of collective
rights into the regime may at the very least, strike a compromise between
the two schools of thought and lead to a more general sense of solidarity
and cooperation on the part of the people of the world, both western and
non-western alike.
B: Problems:
Despite the potential benefits of the fusion of collective and individual
rights, there are several problems that would face the spirit of such
a move, as well as its feasibility. The most fundamental problem concerns,
once again, terms and definitions. If collective rights are to be given
to cultural agents, there must be a way in which these groups can be defined,
identified, and differentiated. The vagueness and subjectivity of terms
such as nation, culture, union, and group would inevitably lead to debate,
disagreement, and potential deadlock in terms of both the effective implementation
and institution of third generation HR. The issue is that, "they
lack a precise object and their realization is dependent upon prevailing..
xircumstances"xl In fact, the more pressing problem involves not
so much what the definitions of these agents may be, but who has the final
authority to make these decisions. In the absence of a common central
authority, such a question is extremely difficult to answer.
This brings me to the second major obstacle: enforcement. Aside from
the obvious ineffective and arguably illegitimate enforceability of all
human rights - mainly due to the inviolable principle of state sovereignty
- it becomes more problematic when one considers the ability to enforce
the right to development, to world peace, and to a clean environment.
Although I think everyone would undeniably agree that these are values
in and of themselves, I find it highly unrealistic to expect that the
current state of global society would be able to effectively enforce a
new category of human rights, especially when one considers that those
drafted over 50 years ago are still highly ineffective in any real capacity.
This too can be attributed to the lack of a central enforcement institution
that can legitimately ensure compliance with the provisions of the UDHR
and the later Additional Protocols, namely those pertaining to collective
rights.
In examining these problems, the first major question that popped into
my head was, why not establish a central authority. The reason: state
sovereignty. This 350 year-old principle is the fundamental collective
right and represents the biggest obstacle to the institution of an empowered
and legitimate central authority capable of enforcing the principles of
this hybridized human rights regime. Although the abovementioned proposal
outlines the possibility of developing a triad of reciprocal rights and
duties between states, individuals, and collectives, there will inevitably
be conflicts and antagonisms between them, raising the question as to
which one will inevitably take precedence. If one takes established practise
in international affairs as a cue, the answer is obviously state sovereignty.
As a result, an established hierarchy of the three key actors would be
established in such a conceptualization, thus precluding any possible
level of real equality between the three actors. Therefore, there would
inevitably be the possibility that the state could play its trump card
vis-a-vis the individual and the nation, negating the very purpose of
the rights regime itself.
C: In the Meantime...
NB - This section actually says allot of what I want to say in the conclusion
so when I write the conclusion, I may decide to just merge the two...
Although the institution of third generation human rights may help to
alleviate many of the concerns of cultural relativists and non-western
nations vis-a-vis the HR regime, due to the abovementioned problems, it
is unlikely that such a drastic reformulation of the status quo will come
about any time soon. Some progress has already been made in this area,
including reference to collective rights in the 1993 Human Rights World
Conference, most important of which was the inclusion of the stipulation,
"While the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne
in mind..."xli However the formulation of the sentence itself is
indicative of the fact that collective and cultural considerations still
take the proverbial back-seat to already established human rights protocols.
As a result, there is a strong need for the discourse between collective
and individual rights to continue, so that, at the very least, the nations
and people of the world may come to a consensual decision as to the best
form the regime can take, given the prevailing values at the time. It
should be noted that HR are the product of a long evolutionary history,
closely linked to the historical circumstances surrounding the Second
World War. It may, as a result, be preferable not to oppose the further
evolution of the regime in order to better represent the true plurality
of the current international arena, rather than appealing to an invariable
and a-temporal set of 'universal' principles developed in 1948. If the
HR regime cannot adapt to the changing circumstances of a changing world,
nor meet the needs and approval of those whom they were made to serve,
namely humans, then perhaps it needs to be completely re-conceptualized.
NB - This section, if I keep it independent of the conclusion, is not
finished. In the 50year reappraisal of HR book put out by the UN in 1998,
there are a few more proposals for immediate action that I would, at the
very least, like to mention.
Conclusion:
The conclusion still needs to be written, but I require for the rest
to be finished before I can tie it all together. I will write down, however,
the central arguments I hope to have defended throughout the paper
a) For the Relativist/Universalist Debate: -to affirm the problems in
the current HR protocols that neglect both culture, collective rights
and non-western values
-I want the back-and-forth to illustrate the current lack of consensus
in the HR regime as is as well as show the problems ass'd with each
-to argue that the regime can potentially 'correct' the abovementioned
problems and address collective rights through the inclusion of 3rd generation
HR
-due to the very nature of 3rd gen. it would also ensure legitimacy because
it requires the collective participation of all
BUT again with this there are problems too - especially its idealism (very
similar to some of the protocols ass'd with the League of Nations system)
-basically, central suggestion for the future would be the continuation
of the discourse between the groups and find a legitimate and workable
consensus, as a result, hopefully we may be able to reinforce the regime,
its provisions as well as set up something to do with enforcement
b) For Singapore
-main point is to show how their particular use of the CR position is
problematic and in many ways doesn't make much sense
HOWEVER their position as a leader defending collective rights is welcomed
and needed THUS they should continue in this capacity, but perhaps limit
their arguments to their 'national' culture as opposed to appealing to
a larger whole
-main point: as a result, they could tie this into the established collective
right of state sovereignty and it would strengthen their position
BUT I want the caution to come out of this concerning the legitimacy of
the Singaporean state and illustrate that it may be for the preservation
of the state rather than the people that this is being pursued
BUT it is good that they are being open about their opposition rather
than subscribing to the regimes principles in theory, but disobeying them
in practise
DOWNLOAD
FREE TERM PAPER »
» »
Besplatni
Seminarski Radovi
FREE TERM PAPERS
|
|